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TAKING OPT-IN RIGHTS SERIOUSLY: WHAT KNOX V.




In the span of one week in June 2012, the United States Supreme
Court deftly amplified corporate political speech rights1 and simultaneously
hampered the political speech rights of unions.2  This election year develop-
ment is troubling in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission3 decision.  One of Citizens United’s proffered
rationales for giving corporations the same political speech rights as human
beings was the equality of all political speakers.4  If corporations are tanta-
mount to humans in the eyes of the law for First Amendment purposes,5
then surely corporations and unions should also be on equal footing.6  Yet
they are not.  On closer inspection, the five-Justice conservative majority of
* Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is an Assistant Professor at Stetson University College of Law where she
teaches Constitutional Law, Election Law, and Corporate Governance.  She would like to thank Profes-
sor David Webber, Professor John C. Coates IV, Professor Anthony Johnstone, Professor Jason Bent,
Nathan Newman, and Professor Glynn Torres-Spelliscy for providing helpful comments to her on an
earlier draft, and she extends her gratitude to her Stetson research assistants, Max Holzbaur, Andrew
Graf, and Jordan Sager, for their help researching this piece, and to attorneys at Jenner & Block who
helped research this issue on a pro bono basis when she was Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice.
1. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011), cert. granted, judg-
ment rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (summarily
reversing the Montana Supreme Court).
2. Knox v. Serv. Employees Intl. Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012).
3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4. Id. at  898 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.  Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” (internal citations omitted)); id. at
914–917 (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which barred corporations and unions from spending their gen-
eral treasuries on electioneering communications).
5. Dahlia Lithwick, The Pinocchio Project: Watching as the Supreme Court Turns a Corporation
into a Real Live Boy, Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2242208/ (Jan. 21, 2010).
6. Post-Citizens United, unlimited independent expenditures can be made by any “non-connected
entities—including individuals, unincorporated associations, non-profit organizations, labor unions, and
for-profit corporations.” Republican Natl. Comm. v. Fed. Election Commn., 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152
(D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010); see also Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense
of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & Pol. 557, 567 (Summer 2012)
(“spending limits are now unconstitutional, even as to corporations and labor unions . . . .”).
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the Supreme Court7 is not as absolutist in its zest for equality as the major-
ity’s opinion in Citizens United indicates.8
This article will explore the implications of the Supreme Court’s dis-
parate treatment of similarly-situated politically active corporations and un-
ions.  Two paths lead to more equitable treatment of these two groups: ei-
ther (1) corporate political speech should be regulated more or (2) union
political speech should be regulated less.  This piece argues in favor of the
former.  In particular, corporate political spending lacks the transparency
and consent mechanisms present in union political spending.  Policymakers
should address both of these failings in the corporate context.
The Roberts Supreme Court’s asymmetrical treatment of corporations
and unions was on full display in the 2011–2012 term.  American Tradition
Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock9 coupled with Knox v. Service Employees Inter-
national Union, Local 100010 demonstrates that a double standard persists
between corporations, who are now privileged speakers in the Court’s eyes,
and unions, who are currently disfavored speakers.  The Supreme Court im-
poses different degrees of consent from corporations’ and unions’ constitu-
ent parts before they electioneer.11  Under U.S. law, corporations are not
required to get consent from their shareholders before the corporate entity
speaks politically using corporate funds.12  By contrast, public-sector un-
7. Here, I am referring to Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.
8. The Court in Citizens United harkened back to the Court in Bellotti, which came to a similar
conclusion. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (citing First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 (1978) (finding the inherent “worth of the speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”)).
9. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491.
10. Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296.
11. Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill of
Rights J. 1, 24–25 (1995) (“The considerations that justify individuals’ use of their wealth to power the
intensity of their advocacy preferences and magnify their advocacy voices . . .  do not justify the advo-
cacy voices of multi-purpose associations.  Members of associations often do not all agree with their
organizations’ collective choice.”).
12. Frances R. Hill, Teaching Elements of Election Law Beyond the Disciplinary Borders of “Elec-
tion Law”, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 789, 799 (Spring 2012) (“Writing for the majority in Citizens United,
Justice Kennedy dismissed this issue with a breezy reference to ‘the ordinary mechanisms of corporate
democracy.’  Experts in corporation law have expressed little confidence in this analysis.”); Anne
Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in
Citizens United, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 497, 530–531 (Winter 2010)  (“Political expenditure deci-
sions—as directors currently implement them—therefore lack the approval or dissent of the citizen-
shareholders, and there is no mechanism for shareholders to obtain detailed information regarding cor-
porate political expenditures absent voluntary disclosures.”).
2
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ions13 must receive nonmembers’14 consent before political spending in cer-
tain circumstances.15
In American Tradition Partnership, the Court had the chance to reex-
amine its controversial decision in Citizens United,16 which held that corpo-
rations have the right to spend their treasury funds for electioneering in
federal elections.17 American Tradition Partnership reviewed a challenge
to Montana’s century-old corporate political expenditure ban and gave the
Court the opportunity to bless state regulation of corporate political spend-
ing in the name of federalism.18  Instead of taking this opportunity to test its
theoretical assumptions about corruption in Citizens United19 by examining
the actual facts arising out of Montana’s well-documented history of corpo-
rate political corruption, the Court summarily reversed the Montana Su-
preme Court.20 American Tradition Partnership generated a slew of new
condemnations as lawyers and reform advocates grasped that the Court
would not deign to hear a case with a more robust factual record than the
thin one offered to the Justices in Citizens United.21  Predictably, four Jus-
13. Public-sector unions are unions representing employees of the government, whether local, state
or federal.
14. Nonmembers of a union are workers who are covered by a union’s collective bargaining agree-
ment who choose not to join the union but are required to pay union dues.
15. For a more in-depth account comparing corporate and union political spending regulations, see
generally Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights after Knox
v. SEIU Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2013).
16. Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing Life into
the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 Am. Bus. L.J. 507, 508 (Fall 2012) (“To say that Citizens United’s
holding is controversial is an understatement.”).
17. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
18. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1308 (granting stay of Montana Supreme Court’s
decision pending review of cert. petition).
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908–909 (“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).
20. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1 (2011), cert. granted, judgment
rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (summarily reversing the
Montana Supreme Court).
21. See e.g. Rachel Weiner, Supreme Court’s Montana Decision Strengthens Citizens United,
Wash. Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/supreme-courts-montana-decision-
strengthens-citizens-united/2012/06/25/gJQA8Vln1V_blog.html (June 25, 2012) (quoting Senator
Chuck Schumer as saying that the Court was “further tipping the balance of power in America in favor
of deep-pocketed, outside interests”); Rick Pearson, Durbin: May Take New Court to Overturn ‘Super
PAC’ Ruling, L.A. Times, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-durbin-may-take-new-court-to-
overturn-super-pac-ruling-20120625,0,5760539.story (June 25, 2012) (quoting Senator Dick Durbin as
saying that the Supreme Court’s decision showed that it did not understand that “oligarchs are trying to
control the political system for their own purposes”); Shannon McGovern, Supreme Court Ruling Lets
Politics Go Up for Sale, U.S. News & World Rep., http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/07/04/
supreme-court-ruling-lets-politics-go-up-for-sale (July 4, 2012) (questioning Frank Askin, the ACLU’s
general counsel, about his view that the Court’s decision in American Tradition Partnership was incor-
rect and a setback for democratic governance); Statement of John Bonifaz, Executive Director, Free
Speech for People: On the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision Striking Down Montana’s Corrupt Practices
Act, http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/node/411 (June 25, 2012) (asserting that the Supreme Court
3
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tices dissented from the summary reversal in American Tradition Partner-
ship, providing yet another 5–4 Supreme Court decision in the area of cam-
paign finance.22 American Tradition Partnership clarified that corporations
would have the unfettered ability to buy political ads in state elections de-
spite the variation among the states or the policy preferences of their re-
spective citizens.
Within a week, the Supreme Court also made new law in Knox,23  a
case that garnered far less fanfare and scrutiny than American Tradition
Partnership.  In Knox, the Court ruled that a public-sector union must give
nonmembers of the union, who pay limited union dues, the ability to opt in
to each new special assessment24 to pay for last-minute political expendi-
tures before the union can spend the money.25  One way of conceptualizing
the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox is that it required consent from non-
members to use their money for political speech.
Until Knox, unions complied with controlling Supreme Court prece-
dent if nonmembers were afforded the opportunity to opt out of the union’s
political spending after the fact.26  The Knox holding represents a titanic
shift by placing corporate managers and union leaders in decidedly diver-
ignored overwhelming factual evidence in order to uphold its previous ruling in Citizens United); Lisa
Rosenberg, Supreme Court Fails to Correct or Amend its Citizens United Decision, Sunlight Foundation
Blog, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/06/25/supreme-court-fails-to-correct-or-amend-its-citi-
zens-united-decision/ (June 25, 2012) (positing that the Supreme Court had a chance to reconsider
whether independent expenditures gave rise to corruption and whether current disclosure laws were
adequate, and concluding that the Court erred in not taking the opportunity to address these points);
Nicole Flatow, The Populist, Bipartisan History of the Now-Invalidated Montana Anti-Corruption Law,
ACS Blog, http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-populist-bipartisan-history-of-the-now-invalidated-mon-
tana-anti-corruption-law (June 25, 2012) (detailing Professor Anthony Johnstone’s account of the his-
tory of Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act and his regret that the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the
landmark legislation after 100 years of campaign finance reform).
22. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2491–2492 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, J.J.).  Other 5–4 Supreme Court campaign finance decisions include: Ariz. Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Davis v. Fed. Election Commn.,
554 U.S. 724 (2008); Fed. Election Commn. v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); and
McConnell v. Fed. Election Commn., 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
23. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2277.
24. Here, a “special assessment” stands in contrast to a regular, annual assessment of union dues.
25. Id. at 2295.
26. See Commun. Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745, 768 (1988) (Labor unions differ from
corporations in that union members who disagree with a union’s political activities need not give up full
membership in the organization to avoid supporting its political activities.  Although a union and an
employer may require that all bargaining unit employees become union members, a union may not
compel those employees to support financially “union activities beyond those germane to collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986) (temporary loans of nonmembers’ money for a union’s political
program violated the First Amendment); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (“Our
decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the pur-
pose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
4
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gent legal positions.27  Corporate managers have an advantage because they
can spend on politics without getting consent from investors or other con-
stituencies.  (Indeed, as will be explained herein, corporations can even hide
their political spending from shareholders.)  Meanwhile, leaders of public-
sector unions must perform the logistically formidable task of gathering
individual opt-ins for special assessments from nonmembers before engag-
ing in certain political spending.
Unions as well as corporations, ranging from tiny nonprofits to large
multinationals, have been empowered by Citizens United28 to spend unlim-
ited treasury funds in politics.29  Unlike unions, however, corporations are
not subject to the opt-in requirement analogous to the Knox requirement for
unions.  Again, U.S. law imposes no duty on corporations to obtain share-
holder consent before engaging in political spending.30  This American rule
(perhaps better described as American rule-less-ness) stands in stark con-
trast to the United Kingdom’s approach to the identical circumstance.31
27. In contrast to Knox, a previous state court case held that unions did not have to get an opt-in for
political spending. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404, 414–419 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming a prelim-
inary injunction against a regulation requiring unions to obtain written permission before using a mem-
ber’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns, reasoning that plaintiffs showed a reasonable
probability of success on their claim that an “opt-in” requirement violated the members’ First Amend-
ment freedom of association rights); see e.g. Erwin Chemerinsky, High Court’s Union Dues Case May
Change the Political Landscape, A.B.A. J., http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_high_
courts_union_dues_case_may_change_the_political_landscape (July 2, 2012); Mark Brenner, Supreme
Court Opens Door to ‘Open Shop’, Labor Notes, http://labornotes.org/2012/07/supreme-court-opens-
door-%E2%80%98open-shop%E2%80%99 (July 23, 2012).
28. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (“Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does prohibit—corporations and unions from using general
treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain
qualified federal elections.”); see also id. at 913 (“[O]verruling Austin ‘effectively invalidate[s] not only
BCRA Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for
express advocacy.’” (internal citation omitted)).
29. Unlimited independent expenditures can be made not just by corporations but any “non-con-
nected entities—including individuals, unincorporated associations, non-profit organizations, labor un-
ions, and for-profit corporations.” Republican Natl. Comm., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 152.  Corporations and
unions could already spend freely on ballot measures. See e.g. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (noting that the
value of speech entitled to First Amendment protection “does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual”).
30. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert L. Jackson, Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
Harv. L. Rev. 83, 89–90 (2010) (“Where the interests of directors and executives diverge from those of
shareholders with sufficient regularity and magnitude, [such as in executive compensation,] corporate
law rules impose special requirements designed to address this conflict.”).
31. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-Authorized Corporate Political Spend-
ing in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 525, 542–548 (2011); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate
Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach, in Risk
Management and Corporate Governance 391 (Jalilvand & Malliaris, eds., Routledge 2011).
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U.K. statutory law requires shareholder authorization prior to corporate po-
litical spending.32
With the Supreme Court unlikely to change legal positions on this is-
sue until the Court’s composition itself changes, the responsibility to foster
more equitable regulations for corporations is left to the American electo-
rate, Congress, the States, and executive agencies, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which must work within the bounda-
ries of current precedent.33  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Knox requiring
opt-ins for union political expenditures provides an additional basis for ar-
guing that publicly traded American corporations should likewise marshal
shareholder consent before corporate political expenditures are made.
II. DEFINITIONS
Before I proceed to meditate about how Knox changed campaign fi-
nance and labor law, defining a few key terms and concepts is in order.
Under labor law, workers in a bargaining unit can take a vote to unionize by
majority rule.34  Even if a minority of workers in the bargaining unit object
to the union, the union will nonetheless represent all of the workers in the
bargaining unit in wage negotiations with managers, and the union can col-
lect membership dues from all of the workers in the bargaining unit regard-
less of their desire to be in the union.35  Those who object to being in the
union are known as “nonmembers.”  Thus unions can have both members
(willing participants paying full-dues) and nonmembers (employees cov-
ered by the collective bargaining agreement who pay limited dues and ob-
ject to being part of the union).
Unions can require nonmember employees to pay their pro rata share
of annual dues to the union for the union’s collective bargaining costs on
32. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–140, & sch. 19 (2000)
(Eng.).
33. Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. Review of Books, http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-threatens-democracy/?pagination=false
(Apr. 15, 2010) (“Congress should also require that any corporation that wished to engage in election-
eering obtain at least the annual consent of its stockholders to that activity and to a proposed budget for
it, and that the required disclosure in an ad report the percentage of stockholders who have refused that
blanket consent.”).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.”).
35. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67 (1975).  The rules are
different in right-to-work states. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 10 (“In right-to-work states,
employees who wish to form a union are effectively forced to subsidize the provision of the union
benefits to co-workers who refuse to support the union.”); Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318 (1953)
(union cannot charge nonmembers a fee in a right-to-work state).
6
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behalf of all employees.36  The union fees for collective bargaining costs
are known as “chargeable expenses” in labor law.37  The requirement that
nonmembers who benefit financially from the union’s collective bargaining
agreement pay dues prevents unfair freeriding.38  This power to collect dues
is not plenary, however, as a line of Supreme Court cases has held that
unions cannot use objecting nonmembers’ dues for political expenditures.39
Before Knox, Supreme Court precedent dictated that nonmembers must be
given a yearly opportunity to opt out of the union’s political spending and
get back the pro rata percentage of their dues attributable to politicking.40
Public-sector unions are those unions that represent employees of the
government.  Courts have been particularly diligent in regulating public-
sector unions to ensure that employees who must join a union in order to
work for the government are not thereby coerced into espousing views the
worker may find objectionable.  Just like private-sector unions, which have
nonmembers, public-sector unions can also have nonmembers.  The Knox
case is about a public-sector union (Service Employees International Union,
Local 1000) and its nonmembers.41
III. THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION BATTLE
One of the fault lines in the legislative and litigation battles over un-
ions’ political spending has been whether union nonmembers must be given
the opportunity to opt in or opt out of the union’s political spending.  Those
hostile to union power have tried to build on the Supreme Court’s rulings
36. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2303.
37. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 17 n. 67 (“[C]hargeable expenses are those deemed to be
for the collective bargaining activities, which nonmembers must pay for, while non-chargeable expenses
are those for political activities, which nonmembers do not need to pay for.”).
38. Ross Runkel, When Union Fees Go Up, Must a “Hudson Notice” Go Out?, SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/when-union-fees-go-up-must-a-“hudson-notice”-go-out/ (Jan. 5,
2012) (“An additional ‘agency shop agreement’ requires non-members in the bargaining unit to pay a
percentage of the dues amount (an ‘agency fee’) to pay for the union’s expenses of performing services
that benefit the bargaining unit.”).
39. See Commun. Workers of Am., 487 U.S. at 745; Abood, 431 U.S. at 231–233; Ysursa v. Poca-
tello Educ. Assn., 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009).
40. Commun. Workers of Am., 487 U.S. at 745; Abood, 431 U.S. at 231–233; Ysursa, 555 U.S. at
359; see also Bebchuk & Jackson, supra n. 30, at 114 (“But the Court has also acknowledged individu-
als’ constitutional interest in avoiding association with political messages with which they disagree—
holding, for example, that unions violate the First Amendment rights of their members when union
leaders spend union funds for political speech that the individual members oppose, even when the
speech is in the members’ collective interest.”).
41.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291–2292.  Unionized workers receive separate protection under Supreme
Court decisions that allow employees who do not want to support the union’s political activities to
demand a refund of the portion of any mandatory union fee that is used for such purposes. See Com-
mun. Workers of Am., 487 U.S. at 743; Abood, 431 U.S. at 240; see also Davenport v. Wash. Educ.
Assn., 551 U.S. 177, 184 (2007) (state may require its public-sector unions to receive affirmative author-
ization from a nonmember before spending the nonmember’s agency fees for election related purposes).
7
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on nonmember opt-outs by adopting so-called paycheck protection laws to
statutorily require opt-ins.42  Unions have resisted paycheck protection ef-
forts all over the country, including in California where the issue has been
on the ballot more than once.43  For example, in 1998 Proposition 226
(“Prop. 226”) would have transformed California into a paycheck protec-
tion state.  Many California unions countered Prop. 226 and were victori-
ous.44  As I was writing this paper in 2012, the California Paycheck Protec-
tion Initiative (“Prop. 32”) was on the ballot and, once again, it lost.45  So
far, the voters have defeated all attempts at adopting paycheck protection in
California.  The Knox case arose out of a union’s efforts to defeat a
paycheck protection ballot measure in 2005.
Unions have been able to defeat paycheck protection ballot measures
and legislative bills in several states.46  This ideological battle has raged
back and forth in the past couple of years.  But California’s story has not
been replicated everywhere.  A handful of states have adopted so-called
paycheck protection laws, which require unions to get nonmembers to opt
in to political spending (as opposed to merely requiring an after the fact opt-
out).47
The issue of paycheck protection has been heavily litigated in the
courts, including the Supreme Court.48  In 2007, in Davenport v. Washing-
42. Robert Reich, It’s Time for a Shareholder Protection Act, http://robertreich.org/post/347547700
(Jan. 22, 2010) (“For many years, anti-union lobbyists have pushed what they call ‘pay-check protec-
tion’ laws, supposedly designed to protect union members from being forced, through their dues, to
support union political activities they oppose. Under such laws—already in effect in several states—no
union dues can be spent for any political purpose unless union members agree.  The same principle
should protect shareholders from being forced to spend their share of corporate earnings in favor of or
against a particular candidate.”).
43. Paycheck protection was on the California ballot in 1998 in Prop. 226 and was defeated. See
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_226,_the_%22Paycheck_
Protection%22_Initiative_(1998) (accessed Feb. 3, 2013).
44. Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement through Union Dues? A Postmodern
Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 447, 466 n. 104 (2000).
45. Joe Mathews, It’s Time to Retire “Paycheck Protection”, NBC S. Cal., http://www.nbclos
angeles.com/blogs/prop-zero/Union-Dues-Paycheck-Protection-Proposition-32-Ballot-Initiative-Conser
vatives-178079541.html (Nov. 10, 2012).
46. See Ariz. S.B. 1365 (defeated in the senate); Colo. Amend. 49 (2008) (defeated by voters); N.C.
S.B. 727 (vetoed by the governor).
47. See e.g. Idaho Code §§ 44–2001 to 2011 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17A.500 (2012);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A–11–1401 to 1404; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.210 (2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§§ 22–25–101 to 115 (2012); Ohio R.C. § 3599.031(H) (this code provision is no longer active due to
United Auto Workers, Local Union 1112 v. Philomena, 700 N.E.2d 936, 947 (Ohio 1998)).
48. Michael C. Kochkodin, A Good Politician Is One That Stays Bought: An Examination of
Paycheck Protection Acts & Their Impact on Union Political Campaign Spending, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. &
Empl. L. 807, 810–822 (2000) (“Today, one of the most talked about issues in the ‘opt in’ versus ‘opt
out’ debate is the emergence of ‘paycheck protection’ acts.  Paycheck protection acts require unions to
obtain written permission from workers before spending worker union dues or agency fees for political
purposes. . . .  Paycheck protection acts abolish ‘opt out’ union funding schemes in which ‘dissent is not
8
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ton Education Association,49 the Supreme Court upheld a state law requir-
ing public-sector labor unions to receive affirmative authorization from a
nonmember before spending the nonmember’s agency-shop fees for electo-
ral purposes.50  Justice Scalia noted in the Davenport lead opinion that pub-
lic-sector unions only have these funds because employees are legally com-
pelled to pay them.51  In other words, the Court found that the restriction is
not on “how the union can spend ‘its’ money; it is a condition placed upon
the union’s extraordinary state entitlement to acquire and spend other peo-
ple’s money.”52 Davenport affirmed the right of states to adopt such
paycheck protection laws under the Constitution.53 Davenport left states
with the freedom to choose between adopting or rejecting paycheck protec-
tion.  In 2012, the Court went one big step further in Knox, by constitution-
ally requiring an affirmative opt-in for nonmembers when public-sector un-
ions make a special assessment to spend in an upcoming election (regard-
less of whether states desire this extra requirement or not).54  Given the
traditional competition between labor and corporations in the political
realm, this begs the question whether the logic of Knox should extend to
corporations as a matter of basic fairness.55
IV. CENTRAL HOLDINGS OF Knox
The Knox case arose out of a 2005 ballot measure fight in California
spawned by Governor Schwarzenegger’s attempt to curb the power of pub-
. . . presumed’ in favor of the creation of ‘opt in’ systems where employees must affirmatively consent
to funding non-collective bargaining union expenditures.”).
49. Davenport, 551 U.S. 177.
50. Robert C. Cloud, Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n: Agency Shop and First Amend-
ment Revisited, 224 Ed. Law Rep. 617, 627 (2007) (Cloud describes the holding in Davenport as fol-
lows: “[T]he Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that Section 760 was constitutional for two
primary reasons: (1) Washington State voters had the legal authority to approve or disapprove agency
shop agreements in the State; they also had the power to add reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions
on the use of agency shop fees and (2) Section 760 enhanced First Amendment protection for dissenters
who do not wish to subsidize political or ideological positions with which they disagree.  To the United
States Supreme Court, such coercion was unacceptable and unconstitutional in a free and democratic
society.”).
51. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 187.
52. Id. (emphasis in original).
53. The Supreme Court has held that “opt-in” requirements are constitutional when applied to
agency-shop fees levied on public employees who are not union members.  In such cases, those making
payments are not union members; rather, they are government employees whose employment is condi-
tioned upon contribution to the union. Id. at 187–188.
54. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
55. Jay Eisenhofer, Citizens United and the Fight for Shareholder Rights, Reuters, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/23/us-citizens-united-idUSBRE87M0WM20120823 (Aug. 23, 2012).
(Eisenhofer discusses Knox and asks, “But which constituency is missing its free-speech rights?  Share-
holders—who currently have no voice in the political expression of the companies in which they in-
vest.”).
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lic-sector unions during a special election.56  To battle Schwarzenegger’s
ballot initiatives, the Service Employees International Union, Local 1000
(“SEIU”) charged its members and nonmembers a special one-time assess-
ment as the 2005 election intensified.  One measure on the California ballot,
Proposition 75 (“Prop. 75”), would have required unions to get employees’
affirmative consent before charging them fees to be used for a union’s polit-
ical purposes.57  Put another way, Prop. 75 would have changed California
into a paycheck protection state in 2005.  Also on the ballot at the same
time was Proposition 76 (“Prop. 76”), which would have given the Gover-
nor of California the power to reduce appropriations for public unions’ em-
ployees’ compensation.58
SEIU’s ability to collect dues from nonmembers, including special as-
sessments, was derived from both California law and contract law.59  SEIU
made a special assessment to pay for the Union’s opposition to the
Schwarzenegger ballot initiatives.  Objecting nonmembers of SEIU, includ-
ing Diane Knox, sued, complaining that the Union’s levying a special as-
sessment without providing them with a second Hudson notice was uncon-
stitutional.60  A “Hudson notice” is a notice given to union nonmembers
alerting them that the union has made political expenditures, so that they
have the ability to opt out of their dues being used for the union’s political
spending after the fact.61  In this case, SEIU had given one Hudson notice
for the past year’s political spending, but not a second Hudson notice for
56. W. James Young, Casting an Overdue Skeptical Eye: Knox v. SEIU, 2011–2012 Cato Sup. Ct.
Rev. 333, 334 (“In 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger proposed four ballot initiatives, sending Califor-
nia’s government-employee labor unions into high dudgeon.”).
57. Paycheck protection was on the California ballot in 1998 in Prop. 226 and was defeated.  Prop.
75 was also defeated in 2005.  Prop. 32, which tried to impose paycheck protection once more, was on
the California ballot in November 2012 and failed. See Joe Garofoli, Teachers Union Drops $7.5 Mil-
lion Against Prop. 32, San Francisco Chronicle Politics Blog, http://blog.sfgate.com/nov05election/
2012/08/03/teachers-union-drops-7-5-million-against-prop-32/ (Aug. 3, 2012).
58. California Legislative Analyst’s Office, Proposition 76: Key Issues and Fiscal Effects, http://
www.lao.ca.gov/2005/prop_76/prop_76_093005.htm (Sept. 30, 2005).
59. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2284, 2295; see also Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 3502(a).
60. Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Knox v. Cal. St. Employees Assn., Local 1000, Serv. Employees Intl. Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 628 F.3d
1115 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Knox v. Serv. Employees Intl. Union, Local 1000,
132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012), vacated sub nom. Knox v. Cal. St. Employees Assn., Local 1000, Serv. Employ-
ees Intl. Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 692 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2012).
61. Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Says Unions Can’t Bill Non-Members For Political Spending,
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/06/21/supreme-court-says-unions-cant-bill-non-
members-for-political-spending/ (June 21, 2012) (“Unions are supposed to separate out political ex-
penses and give non-members a so-called ‘Hudson notice’ explaining the split and giving them the
opportunity to pay only the non-political share of expenses.”).  The name Hudson refers to Chicago
Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
10
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the special assessment to pay for the battle against the Schwarzenegger bal-
lot measures (Prop. 75 and Prop. 76) during the special election in 2005.62
Writing for the majority in Knox, Justice Alito held that unions may
not use objecting nonmembers’ money, even temporarily, for politics:
[R]equiring objecting nonmembers to opt out of paying the nonchargeable
portion of union dues—as opposed to exempting them from making such pay-
ments unless they opt in—represents a remarkable boon for unions. . . .  An
opt-out system creates a risk that the fees paid by nonmembers will be used to
further political and ideological ends with which they do not agree.  But a
“[u]nion should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers
without first establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their
funds will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unre-
lated to collective bargaining.”63
SEIU’s failure to send out a separate Hudson notification drew ire from the
majority, which characterized this behavior as an “aggressive use of power”
and “indefensible.”64
Seven of the nine Justices concluded that a second Hudson notice was
indeed necessary.65  But the five-person majority went even further, stating
that an affirmative opt-in, instead of just an opt-out, was constitutionally
required.  As Justice Alito wrote for the five-person majority:
To respect the limits of the First Amendment, the union should have sent out
a new notice allowing nonmembers to opt in to the special fee rather than
requiring them to opt out.  Our cases have tolerated a substantial impingement
on First Amendment rights by allowing unions to impose an opt-out require-
ment at all.  Even if this burden can be justified during the collection of regu-
lar dues on an annual basis, there is no way to justify the additional burden of
imposing yet another opt-out requirement to collect special fees whenever the
union desires.66
In other words, the majority in Knox required consent before the Union
spent other people’s money on politics.  In the deepest of ironies, Prop. 75,
the paycheck protection ballot measure that was defeated by California’s
voters67 and was the motivation for SEIU to spend in the California election
in 2005, was partially resurrected by judicial fiat in the Knox case, which
requires affirmative opt-ins for a public-sector union’s political spending.
One thing that Knox does not clarify is whether opt-ins will be re-
quired of public-sector unions as a general matter whenever they make po-
litical expenditures or whether the requirement will only apply to special
assessments.  Another open question is whether Knox’s opt-in requirement
62. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285–2286.
63. Id. at 2290 (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 305) (internal citations omitted).
64. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291.
65. Id. at 2296–2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
66. Id. at 2293 (majority).
67. Institute for Governmental Studies, Proposition 75, http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/elections/
proposition-75 (Nov. 8, 2005).
11
Torres-Spelliscy: Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could Mean for
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 12  8-APR-13 12:52
112 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 74
will only be applied in the context of public-sector unions.  Unions at pri-
vate companies do not necessarily raise the same concerns about govern-
mental compelled speech because of a lack of state action.  The language in
Knox seems quite broad, but only future cases with different facts will clar-
ify the scope of Knox’s holdings.
What is clear is that in Knox the Supreme Court continued a peculiar
pattern of providing fewer protections to unions vis-à-vis other political
spenders.  As Professor Charlotte Garden argues, “When it comes to First
Amendment protections, it has been well documented that labor unions re-
ceive less protection than other social movement groups, and their speech
sometimes receives less protection than even commercial speech.”68
V. THE LOGIC OF REQUIRING OPT-IN FOR PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS
Although the issue of nonmember opt-in had not been fully briefed,69
the Supreme Court in Knox crafted, seemingly out of whole cloth, a broad
new right for nonmembers of public-sector unions to consent to political
expenditures before the fact:
Public-sector unions have the right under the First Amendment to express
their views on political and social issues without government interference.
But employees who choose not to join a union have the same rights. . . . when
a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union
must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from non-
members without their affirmative consent.70
Again, the Supreme Court could not have been clearer in stating that public-
sector unions in particular must give nonmembers the ability to opt in to
each new special assessment for political spending.
The Supreme Court reasoned that opt-ins were constitutionally re-
quired for public-sector unions for three reasons: (A) nonmembers had the
right not to be compelled to speak; (B) the government could not be forced
68. Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?,
53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 17 (2011); see also James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First
Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984) (“On the
ladder of First Amendment values, political speech occupies the top rung, commercial speech rests on
the rung below, and labor speech is relegated to a ‘black hole’ beneath the ladder.”).
69. Had the issue been fully briefed, the Court may have taken more care to notice that the non-
members in this case had not been forced to pay for the special assessment at all.  Fisk & Chemerinsky,
supra n. 15, at 17 (“[F]or the fiscal year that began in July 2005, the SEIU’s nonchargeable expenditures
were lower than they had been in the year ending June 2005.  Only 31% of its expenditures were
nonchargeable (as compared to 44% in the prior year).  Hence, the dissenters ended up being charged
less, including the emergency temporary assessment, than was their fair share of the union’s annual
expenses.  Thus, on the facts of the case, none of the plaintiffs was actually forced to subsidize any
political speech.” (internal citations omitted)).
70. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295–2296 (internal citations omitted).
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to subsidize the union’s political speech; and (C) dissenting workers need
particular protection.
A. The Right Not to Speak
The Supreme Court has long held the view that the First Amendment
protects not only the right to speak but also the right not to speak.  The
compelled speech cases prevent the government from forcing individuals
from endorsing messages that the individual would rather not espouse.71
As a consequence of the right not to speak, nonmembers of both pri-
vate- and public-sector unions have the right to object to funding union
spending that is not germane to the union’s collective bargaining responsi-
bilities.72  This right not to be compelled to speak in the union context is
rooted in federal statutes (such as the Railway Labor Act73 and the National
Labor Relations Act74), as well as the First Amendment.75
The right to be free of compelled speech applies to both “agency
shops,” under which employees can choose whether to join the union, and
“union shops,” under which all employees must be union members.  Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, in the union shops, unions must avail poten-
71. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) (hold-
ing that a statute requiring law schools to accommodate military recruiters does not constitute compelled
speech); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court
always assumed that the proscription on compelled-subsidy speech did not apply when the government
was the speaker); U.S. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (stating that the First Amend-
ment “prevent[s] the government from compelling individuals to express certain views or from compel-
ling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object” (internal citations omitted));
Bd. of Regents of U. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233–234 (2000) (holding that a required
student fee to fund extracurricular activities at a university is not compelled speech so long as the
funding is viewpoint neutral); Riley v. Natl. Fedn. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988)
(stating that, for First Amendment purposes, no difference exists between compelled speech and com-
pelled silence); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (stating that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent both limiting speech and coercing speech).
72. From a constitutional point of view, the opt-out requirements’ being extended to private-sector
unions is particularly interesting since there is not any obvious state action in a contract among private
parties. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens
United, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 807 n. 28 (2012) (citing Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and
the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 Hastings L.J. 1, 83 (1989) (“[L]abor law
. . . has statutorily protected constitutional interests of workers by balancing workers’ right of free
association against other competing legitimate interests [even absent state action].”)).
73. See Intl. Assn. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
74. Commun. Workers of Am., 487 U.S. at 745 (decided on statutory, not constitutional, grounds);
see also Garden, supra n. 68, at 37 (“The Court ultimately avoided the constitutional question and held
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the NLRA permitted unions and employers to require em-
ployees to become union members, but the ‘“membership” that could be required had been “whittled
down to its financial core,” . . . [which] covered ‘the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to
“performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on
labor-management issues.”’”).
75. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 226.
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tial members of membership that has been “whittled down to its financial
core” of negotiating labor contracts and other economic matters between
labor and management, such as strikes.76  In Knox, the Court’s concern with
compelled speech was at the heart of the decision.  As the Court wrote:
[B]y allowing unions to collect any fees from nonmembers and by permitting
unions to use opt-out rather than opt-in schemes when annual dues are billed,
our cases have substantially impinged upon the First Amendment rights of
nonmembers. . . .  The general rule—individuals should not be compelled to
subsidize private groups or private speech—should prevail.77
Another way of framing this is the Supreme Court hereby privileged the
autonomy of the individual over the autonomy of the labor organization to
speak (or not speak) politically.
B. No Government Subsidies for Political Speech
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence makes it evident that the govern-
ment is not required to subsidize political speech, including in the public-
sector union context.78  As the Court clarified in Davenport, “it is well es-
tablished that the government can make content-based distinctions when it
subsidizes speech.”79
In 2009’s Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association,80 the Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Idaho statute that imposed crimi-
nal penalties on unions that funded political activities with money automati-
cally deducted from government employees’ paychecks.  This law required
unions to collect any money to be used for political speech separately from
union dues.  The Court upheld the Idaho law, concluding once more that the
government “is not required to assist others in funding the expression of
76. Natl. Labor Rel. Bd. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
77. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295.
78. Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (Congress could “re-
fuse[ ] to pay for the lobbying out of public monies.”); Smith v. Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465
(1979) (per curiam) (“First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government
to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize [a labor] association and bargain with it”); see also
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 71–73 (2008) (noting that a rule restricting the
use of state funds to promote or oppose unionization impermissibly expressed a pro-union preference,
thereby chilling one side of the public debate).
79. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 188–189; see also Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359 (“Idaho is under no obliga-
tion to aid the unions in their political activities.  And the State’s decision not to do so is not an abridge-
ment of the unions’ speech . . . .”); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2816
(“‘Laws that burden political speech are’ accordingly ‘subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.’”); id. at 2834 (“And under the First Amendment, that makes all the difference.  In
case after case, year upon year, we have distinguished between speech restrictions and speech subsi-
dies.”).
80.  Ysursa, 555 U.S. 353.
14
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particular ideas, including political ones.”81 Knox likewise concluded, “The
government may not prohibit the dissemination of ideas it disfavors, nor
compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves.”82
C. Dissenting Workers’ Rights
The Knox majority was particularly concerned with the rights of work-
ers who were involuntarily nonmembers of the union, who might object to
the union’s political views.  As the majority stated, “When a State estab-
lishes an ‘agency shop’ that exacts compulsory union fees as a condition of
public employment, ‘[t]he dissenting employee is forced to support finan-
cially an organization with whose principles and demands he may disa-
gree.’”83
The Supreme Court referred to this situation as an “impingement” on
the First Amendment rights of the dissenting workers.84  The Court’s con-
cern with the rights of dissenting union members is not a newfangled con-
cept.85  For example, in 1991, a plurality of the Supreme Court held in
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association:86
The burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great where, as here,
the compelled speech is in a public context.  By utilizing [the employees’]
funds for political lobbying and to garner the support of the public in its en-
deavors, the union would use each dissenter as “an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”87
Thus, the Court has been and continues to be solicitous towards workers
who do not wish to subsidize unions’ political speech.  Overall, this is con-
sistent with the general pattern of the courts being more eager to curtail the
political speech rights of unions88 than they have been with corporate politi-
cal speech.89  As a matter of equity, the Court should be troubled as well
about the inability of shareholders to consent to corporate political spend-
ing.
81. Id. at 357–358.
82. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2288.
83. Id. at 2282.
84. Id.
85. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1746–1747 (May 2005)
(explaining that dissenters “speak truth to power” by attempting to persuade the majority).
86. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
87. Id. at 522 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
88. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 243–244 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“I am unable to see a constitu-
tional distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement that a public employee be a Democrat
or Republican or else lose his job, and a similar requirement that a public employee contribute to the
collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union.”).
89. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (upholding corporate speech rights over shareholder
protection objections); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793–795 (same).
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VI. STATUTORY REGULATION OF UNION AND CORPORATE SPEECH
Knox was not drafted on a blank slate.  Congress, state legislatures,
voters, and courts have contested the political rights of unions for at least
six decades.  From a statutory point of view, corporations and unions have
often been regulated in parallel ways for campaign finance purposes.  These
groups have been policed as the result of a bipartisan tug of war: Democrats
typically target corporations, while Republicans typically target unions.90
The following is a brief overview of how corporations and unions have
been subjected to nearly identical legal schemas.
For the past sixty-plus years, federal statutory law has treated unions
and corporations equally for the purposes of campaign finance expenditure
and contribution bans.  For instance, both groups are forbidden from di-
rectly contributing to federal candidates under the Tillman (1907)91 and
Taft-Hartley (1947) Acts.92  In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act banned both
unions and corporations from making independent expenditures in favor of
federal candidates.93  While the direct contribution ban persists because of a
case called Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,94 Citizens United
has negated the independent expenditure ban.95
90. Samuel F. Wright, Clipping the Political Wings of Labor Unions: An Examination of Existing
Law and Proposals for Change, 5 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 1, 35 (1982) (“Because labor union contribu-
tions and expenditures overwhelmingly favor Democrats, several Republican Senators and Congressmen
have introduced bills designed to ‘clip the political wings’ of labor unions.”).
91. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
92. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance after the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 1179, 1198 n. 98 (2002) (asserting that an arguable justification for
treating corporations and unions the same has to do with “the same combination of government-pro-
vided support and lack of correlation between the payment of union dues and support for the union’s
electoral position [that] provide support for the limits on unions”); Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corpo-
rations?: The Constitutionality of Limitations on Corporate Electoral Speech after Citizens United, 46
U.S.F. L. Rev. 307, 312–313 (Fall 2011) (“Four decades after the enactment of the Tillman Act, Con-
gress passed the Taft-Hartley Act (also known as the Labor Management Relations Act).  This 1947 law
prohibited corporations and labor unions from making independent expenditures in support of, or in
opposition to, federal candidates.  Taft-Hartley was the precursor to the provision of McCain-Feingold
struck down by the Court in Citizens United.” (internal citations omitted)).
93. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Labor, To Regulate Labor Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 804
and H.R. 1483, 78th Cong. (1943) (Con. Gerald W. Landis (R-IN) testified, “The public was aroused by
many rumors of huge war chests being maintained by labor unions, of enormous fees and dues being
extorted from war workers, of political contributions to parties and candidates which later were held as
clubs over the head of high Federal officials.” And he sought to “put labor unions on exactly the same
basis, insofar as their financial activities are concerned, as corporations have been on for many years.”).
94. Fed. Election Commn. v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
95. U.S. v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 614 (4th Cir. 2012) (Beaumont is still good law), cert. denied,
No. 12-579, 2013 WL 656067 (Feb. 25, 2013). Accord Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v.
Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 867–869 (8th Cir. 2012); Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 2011);
Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan, —- F. Supp. 2d —-, 2012 WL 4764152 at **1–3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2012),
aff’d, No. 12-3305, 2012 WL 5259036 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2012); see also Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc.
v. Tooker, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 869 (S.D. Iowa 2011), certified question answered, Iowa Right To Life
16
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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) allowed both
corporations and unions to establish separate segregated funds (a.k.a.
PACs), which may solicit and collect money from specified corporate- or
union-affiliated individuals96 and make contributions to candidates.97  Prior
to Citizens United, both groups were required to spend through PACs in
federal elections.98  The two groups were allowed to communicate directly
with their own members without running afoul of the campaign finance
laws.99  Both were also subject to certain disclosure requirements under
federal law.100  The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) has promulgated
regulations to enforce campaign finance laws, and these FEC regulations
have treated both groups with similar strictures.101
In 2002, when Congress closed loopholes in the federal campaign fi-
nance laws, it chose to treat corporations and unions identically once
Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 808 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 2011) (“pursuant to Beaumont, Iowa can generally ban
all direct corporate contributions.”).
96. Fed. Election Commn. v. Natl. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding  FECA’s
limitations on a corporation’s ability to solicit funds for its SSF to its limited class).
97. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B).  The limited class for corporations is defined as stockholders, execu-
tive personnel, administrative personnel, and family members.  11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(1) (2011).  For
unions, the limited class is union members, executive personnel, administrative personnel, and family
members.  11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(2).
98. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 588
(2011) (“The Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) blessed the political action committee (“PAC”)
alternative: corporations and unions could establish separate political committees to spend money on
these campaigns, but these PACs were limited in both the amount that could be contributed to candi-
dates and who could be solicited to contribute.”); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154 (“[T]he [corporate contri-
bution] ban has always done further duty in protecting ‘the individuals who have paid money into a
corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to
support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.’” (internal citations omitted)); id. at 163
(“The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds
for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and
it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . . .”).
99. U.S. v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 123–124 (1948) (“We are unwilling to say that
Congress by its prohibition against corporations or labor organizations making an ‘expenditure in con-
nection with any election’ of candidates for federal office intended to outlaw such a publication.  We do
not think § 313 reaches such a use of corporate or labor organization funds.”).
100. Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political Spending
after Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 443, 452 (2012) (“Under McCain-Feingold,
corporations and unions were subject to two major expenditure prohibitions as well as disclaimer, dis-
closure, and reporting requirements . . . .”).
101. Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square Pegs: The Challenges for Existing Federal
Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 329,
336 (2012) (“For the last thirty years, the FEC has developed rules governing the participation of corpo-
rations and labor unions in electioneering activities based on the principle that both contributions and
expenditures were forbidden.”).  After Citizens United, the FEC announced that it would not enforce the
federal ban on expenditures by corporations or unions.  FEC Press Release, FEC Statement on the Su-
preme Court’s Decision in Citizens United v. FEC, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2010/20100205
CitizensUnited.shtml (Feb. 5, 2010).
17
Torres-Spelliscy: Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could Mean for
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 18  8-APR-13 12:52
118 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 74
more.102  Congress banned both from making so-called “sham issues ads”
(a.k.a. electioneering communications).103  This electioneering communica-
tion ban, along with Taft-Hartley’s independent expenditure ban, were
overturned as unconstitutional in Citizens United, thereby allowing both
groups to spend in federal elections, so long as they spend the money inde-
pendently of federal candidates.104  The 2002 law (known as “McCain-
Feingold,” the “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,” or “BCRA”) also
banned corporations and unions from donating so-called “soft money” to
political parties.105  The BCRA soft money ban still survives.106
The motivation behind the federal corporate and union bans was a nor-
mative judgment by Congress that economic war chests should not be con-
verted into political war chests.107  As the Supreme Court explained in Fed-
eral Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee,108 the two
primary purposes of the bans were to: (1) “ensure that substantial aggrega-
tions of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corpo-
rate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests’
102. Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance
Law, 92 Geo. L.J. 871, 935 (2004) (“BCRA’s new limitations on corporate and union electoral activity
further restrict executives’ ability to misuse ‘other people’s money’ by prohibiting expenditure of gen-
eral treasury funds on parties or sham issue advertising campaigns.”).
103. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203,
116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2002)) (prohibiting corporations and unions
from using funds to fund electioneering communications or for speech expressly targeting a political
candidate); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (defining “electioneering communications”).
104. Hasen, supra n. 6, at 557 (“Congress failed to fill the gaping holes in the federal disclosure
rules that followed the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, freeing corporate and labor union
money in the political process.” (internal citations omitted)).
105. 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2002); Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 Geo. L.J. 1259,
1266–1267 (Apr. 2012) (“Within a few election cycles, innovative lawyers carved loopholes in the
federal restrictions, and reformers crafted and pushed for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
to plug the loopholes.  The 2002 Act banned soft money contributions to parties (which previously were
unlimited) and restricted ‘sham issue ad’ political spending by corporations and unions.” (internal cita-
tions omitted)); Jan Witold Baran, Address Money, Politics, and Lobbying, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 913, 915
(Summer 2009) (“[BCRA] also federalized fundraising by political parties by prohibiting the solicita-
tion, collection, or use of ‘soft money,’ which predominantly were funds from corporations and un-
ions.”).
106. Republican Natl. Comm., 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (upholding
BCRA’s party fundraising restrictions).
107. U.S. v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585, 590–592 (1957) (describing the government’s
effort “to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those
who exercise control over large aggregations of capital”); id. at 572 (quoting H. Comm. on Election of
Pres., Vice-Pres., & Reps. in Cong., Hearing on Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential
and Other Campaigns, 59th Cong. (1906) (“The greatest moral question which now confronts us is,
Shall the trusts and corporations be prevented from contributing money to control or aid in controlling
elections?”)); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court operates with a
sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to
regulate the role that corporations and unions play in electoral politics.”).
108. Natl. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197.
18
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which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided
by the contributions”; and (2) “protect the individuals who have paid money
into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates
from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they
may be opposed.”109  The law provided these protections for over 60 years.
Now those protections have largely been eradicated through Citizens United
and its 2012 companion, American Tradition Partnership.
VII. THE SUPREME COURT’S SUPERFICIAL EQUAL TREATMENT OF
CORPORATIONS AND UNIONS
Following Congress’s lead, the Supreme Court has also treated corpo-
rations and unions similarly with respect to campaign finance bans, with
one notable exception in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.110
The Court has traditionally thought of corporate and union spending in the
same breath.  For example, pre-Citizens United, the Court was equally fo-
cused on preventing ideological nonprofits from funneling corporate and
union money into federal elections.111  And in 2003, in McConnell v. Fed-
eral Election Commission,112 the Supreme Court held that the federal gov-
ernment can constitutionally prohibit political parties from accepting corpo-
rate and union money.113
For most of the twentieth century, the Court deferred to Congress’s
and state legislatures’ line-drawing judgments in campaign finance statutes,
including the choice to ban certain organizations from spending in elec-
tions.114  That deference ended with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death and
109. Id. at 207–208; see also Fed. Election Commn. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the
conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”); id. (“Direct
corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic mar-
ketplace may provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”).
110. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  Austin upheld a Michigan law that
banned corporate independent expenditures but not unions’.  As the Court in Austin explained, “Whereas
unincorporated unions, and indeed individuals, may be able to amass large treasuries, they do so without
the significant state-conferred advantages of the corporate structure.” Id. at 665.
111. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 263–264 (invalidating then-applicable independent
expenditure limits on nonprofit corporations that accepted no money from business corporations or labor
unions).  Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Bellotti, felt corporations and unions could both be subject to
campaign finance limitations. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 826–827 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding “any
particular form of organization upon which the State confers special privileges or immunities different
from those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor
union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.”).
112. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
113. Id. at 155–156, partially overruled on other grounds, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
114. Beaumont, 523 U.S. at 159–160 (“[C]oncern about the corrupting potential underlying the cor-
porate ban may indeed be implicated by advocacy corporations.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt. PAC, 528
U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding low contribution limits against First Amendment challenge); Cal. Med.
Assn. v. Fed. Election Commn., 453 U.S. 182, 200–201 (1981) (“The differing restrictions placed on
19
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Justice O’Connor’s retirement and the ascension to the bench of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Alito in 2006.  As Justice Breyer once complained
about his new brethren: “It is not often in the law that so few have so
quickly changed so much.”115
The Roberts Supreme Court held in Citizens United that requiring po-
litical activity to be conducted through separate segregated funds or PACs
impermissibly burdens corporate and union freedom of expression.116  This
dismantling of the rules on organizational political spending is part of a
greater deregulatory trend led by the Supreme Court.  Over the past six
years, the Roberts Supreme Court has actively deregulated many of the
rules that heretofore had governed campaign finance in both federal and
state elections.117  Not only has the Court struck down Vermont’s contribu-
tion limits as being too low,118 invalidated the federal Millionaire’s Amend-
ment as discrimination against the rich,119 and declared that the tie goes to
the speaker should one arise between speakers and regulators,120 but in Citi-
zens United, the Supreme Court gave corporations and unions the First
Amendment right to spend an unlimited amount of money on political
ads—placing them on equal footing with human beings.121  And capping
off this trend, American Tradition Partnership reaffirmed Citizens United
for the purpose of state elections.
This deregulation has rippled through lower courts as well.  Thanks to
a lesser-known 2010 case called SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Com-
mission,122 corporations and unions have a new political vehicle to use:
individuals and unincorporated associations, on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the
other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that
they therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral
process.”); United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 585 (describing Congressional efforts “to avoid the delete-
rious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over
large aggregations of capital.”).
115. Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court Right Back to Reagan, USA Today, http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-28-supreme-court-right_N.htm (June 29, 2007) (quoting
Breyer, J.).  To be fair, Justice Breyer was talking about the impact of the new Justices on school
desegregation jurisprudence in this quote, but his analysis could apply to what Justices Roberts and Alito
have done to campaign finance law as well.
116. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive
to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”).
117. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn
in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1064 (2008).
118. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261–263 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s contribution and
expenditure limits).
119. Davis, 554 U.S. at 743–744 (invalidating the federal Millionaire’s Amendment).
120. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 474 (“WRTL II”) (invalidating the federal source restriction
for ads that were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy).
121. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900; see also Steven Greenhouse, A Campaign Finance
Ruling Turned to Labor’s Advantage, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/politics/a-
campaign-finance-ruling-turned-to-labors-advantage.html (Sept. 25, 2011).
122. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Commn., 599 F.3d 686 (2010).
20
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independent expenditure only committees or what the press has dubbed
“Super PACs.”123  Super PACs have enabled corporations and unions to
aggregate their unlimited funds along with money from individuals and as-
sociations to buy political ads in federal elections, so long as the ads are
purchased independently of candidate campaigns.  The creation of Super
PACs for both corporations and unions has been blessed by the FEC.124
When it comes to analyzing the campaign finance regulation of corpo-
rations and unions, the Supreme Court has been willing to uphold (in the
case of Beaumont) or strike down (in the case of Citizens United) regula-
tions for both groups with an even hand.  But as discussed in this piece, the
Supreme Court has simultaneously participated in diluting the ability of un-
ions to use their rights to spend in politics through the opt-out and opt-in
cases.
VIII. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNION AND
CORPORATE CONTEXTS
Arguably, unions should never have been lumped in with corporations
in federal campaign finance laws since the two groups are structurally dif-
ferent.125  Academics have argued that corporations deserve more restric-
tive campaign finance regulation than their union counterparts because of
the state conferred advantages that go with the corporate form, such as lim-
ited liability for investors and perpetual existence.126
123. Bauerly & Hallstrom, supra n. 101, at 343–344 (“Citizens United, SpeechNow, as well as EM-
ILY’s List, and more recently Carey, concluded that neither FECA’s prohibition on corporate and labor
union contributions nor its amount limits may constitutionally be applied to contributions made for the
purpose of financing independent communications.”).
124. FEC Press Release, FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC: Reporting Guidelines for Political Com-
mittees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/Press2011/
20111006postcarey.shtml (Oct. 5, 2011) (“The Commission will no longer enforce 2 U.S.C.
§§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3), as well as any implementing regulations, against any nonconnected
political committee with regard to contributions from individuals, political committees, corporations,
and labor organizations . . . .”).
125. See e.g. Sachs, supra n. 72 (Sachs discusses why opt-out rights available to union members
create an inherently unequal relationship when compared with corporations because shareholders have
no right to object to corporate political spending.  Additionally, the article points out other advantages
that government confers upon corporations, including limited liability and tax exemptions.).
126. See e.g. Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 31, 56 (2004) (Hasen
discusses the now overruled Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce and its rationale as to why
campaign finance regulations can target corporations and not labor unions.  Namely, it is due to the
state-conferred advantages provided vis-à-vis the corporate structure and the fact that shareholders have
no opt-out rights.); Reza Dibadj, Expressive Rights for Shareholders after Citizens United?, 46 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 459, 467 (Fall 2011).
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Moreover, labor unions make up the lowest percentage of the Ameri-
can workforce in nearly a century.127  The smaller scale of unions compared
to the scale of corporations is an additional reason that formal equal treat-
ment may lead to unequal results.128  Even the biggest union129 is dwarfed
when compared with the biggest corporation.130  As the Supreme Court
once wrote in Buckley v. Valeo,131 “Sometimes the grossest discrimination
can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly
alike.”132
Furthermore, union members working in a single location are more
likely to share political opinions vis-à-vis economic policy choices in com-
parison with disparate shareholders living around the world, who may have
nothing in common.133  This is an additional reason why unions should get
127. Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y.
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html
(Jan. 23, 2013) (“That brought unionization to its lowest level since 1916 . . . .”).
128. See e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1031 (2012) (“Labor
unions can lobby and make political contributions, but their political power has steadily subsided for
decades as the percentage of the unionized U.S. work force has declined.”); Emma Greenman, Note,
Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap to Campaign Finance Reform
in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24 J.L. & Pol. 209, 242–243 (Summer 2008) (“Concentrated
aggregations of corporate and union money are not equally distributed, and political spending may not
reflect the interests or preferences of the dispersed shareholders or union members who ultimately con-
trol the company or union.  Giving the diverse community of shareholders and union members the
opportunity to opt-out, or prevent corporate and union general treasury dollars from being spent in the
political arena, could provide a valuable check on the use of money aggregated in the economic arena to
disproportionately influence the political debate.”).
129. One could argue about how to define the “biggest” in this context.  According to the U.S.
Department of Labor, the U.S. labor union with the most assets ($480 million) in 2012 was Electrical
Workers IBEW AFL-CIO, and the U.S. labor union with the most members (11.5 million) in 2012 was
the AFL-CIO.
130. Sprague & Wells, supra n. 16, at 508 (“But what the Citizens United majority conveniently
ignored is one particular attribute which has existed for at least one hundred years: that exceptionally
large corporations, controlled by a handful of individuals, have amassed great quantities of wealth and
power, which dwarf the resources of the individual electorate, as well as the corporations’ own minority
shareholders, ultimately diluting individuals’ political voice.”); see also Vincent Trivett, 25 U.S. Mega
Corporations: Where They Rank If They Were Countries, Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.
com/25-corporations-bigger-tan-countries-2011-6 (June 27, 2011) (“If Wal-Mart were a country, its rev-
enues would make it on par with the GDP of the 25th largest economy in the world [ ], surpassing 157
smaller countries.”); Steve Coll, Gusher: The Power of ExxonMobil, The New Yorker, http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2012/04/09/120409fa_fact_coll (Apr. 9, 2012) (“ExxonMobil has developed
an algorithmic formula for political spending and lobbying that has reinforced its alignment with Repub-
lican candidates.  Exxon’s annual revenues, of four hundred billion dollars, are about the same as the
GDP of Norway.”).
131. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
132. Id. at 97–98 (referring to the differential treatment of major and minor political parties under
FECA).
133. Richard L. Hasen, Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law’s Emerging Egalitarian, 1 Alb.
Govt. L. Rev. 169, 191 (2008) (Hasen discusses his disappointment with Justice Souter’s dissent in
WRTL II because it equated labor union spending with corporate spending.  The author then goes on to
22
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more (not less) flexibility in political spending in comparison to corpora-
tions.134
As Professor Adam Winkler once explained, union members are likely
to have more information about their union’s political spending than a
shareholder is going to have about corporate political spending: “sharehold-
ers simply will not know when the corporations in which they have invested
make political expenditures, much less make them to support causes they
disagree with or make them with general treasury funds . . . .”135  By con-
trast, union members may be more in the know.  As Professor Winkler con-
tinued:
A union member may actually be better able to discover the use of his dues
than a shareholder because he works with other dues-paying members in a
union shop where information may spread easily. . . .  [A] dissenting share-
holder . . . faces problems associated with limited control and limited knowl-
edge that make divestment an utterly ineffective remedy for unwanted corpo-
rate electoral spending.136
This is one more reason why prophylactic rules/laws requiring disclosure in
the corporate political spending context are needed.
A. Transparency Differences among Corporations and Unions
While corporations and unions get similar treatment in terms of federal
contribution bans, the parallels end there.  Union political speech is far
more heavily regulated under current labor law.  For example, union politi-
cal spending is more transparent than its corporate analog.137  Unions file
political reports with the Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Manage-
ment Standards pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting Act of
1959.138  A reporting union must distribute this information to its mem-
bers,139 and the Department of Labor treats this information as public.140
discuss the reasons why union spending more closely resembles the opinions of its members than does
corporate spending, namely, the fact that union members have opt-out rights whereas corporate political
spending is controlled by a few incredibly wealthy business executives.).
134. Natl. Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he ‘differing structures and purposes’ of
different entities ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electo-
ral process.’” (quoting Cal. Med. Assn., 453 U.S. at 201)).
135. Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 133, 167–168 (1998).
136. Id. at 205.
137. See e.g. Adam Crowther, Opponents of Campaign Finance Disclosure Create False Distinc-
tions in Treatment of Unions and Corporations: The DISCLOSE Act Would Apply Equally to Both,
Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/documents/campaign-finance-disclosure-unions-vs-corporations-
report.pdf (Nov. 28, 2012); Rick Cohen, Time to Revive Democracy in the U.S.: Tell Shareholders How
Their Dollars Are Used in Politics, The Nonprofit Quarterly, http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/author/
2-uncategorised/18971-time-to-revive-democracy-in-the-us-tell-shareholders-how-their-dollars-are-used
-in-politics.html#.URAqVKU72Ag (Jan. 11, 2012).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 431.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c).
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Form LM-2141 requires the union to disclose “all direct and indirect . . .
political disbursements or contributions in money,” defined as any disburse-
ment “intended to influence” the outcome of a primary or general election,
as well as all lobbying disbursements made with the intent of influencing
public policy.142  Form LM-2 also requires the disclosure of additional in-
formation that pertains to disbursements of $5,000 or more, including infor-
mation about the recipient, amount, and purpose.143  The filing organization
must also report the total amount it disbursed for the filing period.144  Cop-
ies of completed LM-2 forms are available online through the Labor De-
partment’s website.145
Corporations are not under similar legal duties to disclose their politi-
cal spending to investors.  In 2010, Nell Minow, an expert in corporate
governance, gave a speech addressing the new corporate political spending
unleashed by Citizens United and the transparency problem it created for
investors.  Ms. Minow urged:
If investors are going to be able to send some kind of a market reaction to this
political speech by corporations, we have to have better disclosure.  We are
currently facing a situation where some companies are taking public positions
in favor of one thing and then funneling money to intermediary groups to
oppose it. We can’t have that any more.  So, we need better disclosure about
the contributions and other kinds of political speech pay, that is paid out.146
The SEC, which regulates publicly traded companies, should take a page
from the Labor Department’s playbook and require transparency from cor-
porations that spend in politics.147  At present, the SEC rules contain no
requirement for publicly traded companies to inform the investing public
about their political spending.148  This may change in the near future.149  In
140. 29 U.S.C. § 435.
141. 29 C.F.R. §§ 403.2 to 403.3.
142. See Department of Labor, Instructions for Electronic Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual




145. See Department of Labor, Union Search, http://kcerds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (ac-
cessed Feb. 3, 2013).
146. Nell Minow, Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture, transcript and audio available at http://www.
sechistorical.org/museum/programs/2010/ (Mar. 17, 2010).
147. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Could the SEC Please Give Democracy a Hand?, Thomson Reuters
News & Insight, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/2012/01_-_January/Could_
the_SEC_please_give_democracy_a_hand_/ (Jan. 9, 2012); Courteney Keatinge, Companies Still Silent
on Their Use of Free Speech, Glass Lewis & Co., http://www.glasslewis.com/blog/companies-still-
silent-on-their-use-of-free-speech/ (Nov. 9, 2012).
148. David Earley & Ian Vandewalker, Transparency for Corporate Political Spending: A Federal
Solution, Brennan Center, http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/transparency-corporate-political-
spending-federal-solution (Aug. 1, 2012); see e.g. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spend-
ing: Giving Shareholders a Voice at 3, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/corporate-
campaign-spending-giving-shareholders-voice (Jan. 27, 2010) (“Corporate law is ill-prepared for this
24
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2011, ten corporate law professors petitioned the SEC to require disclosure
of corporate political spending.150  A record-breaking 480,000 people filed
public comments with the Commission urging it to act on this petition.151
In late 2012, the SEC placed a potential rule addressing corporate political
spending on the Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Regulatory
Agenda.152  According to the OMB, a notice of proposed rule-making on
corporate political spending by the SEC is scheduled for 2013.153
B. Differences in Consent for Corporations and Unions
Besides the differences in the level of transparency for politically ac-
tive corporations and unions, there is also a marked difference in the level
of consent that each group is required to get from its constituents before it
spends in politics.  As Professors Bebchuk and Jackson explain in the
Harvard Law Review: “corporate law rules do not require a company to
separate political spending from other expenses or to provide shareholders
with specific details about that spending.”154
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Citizens United seemed hopelessly
optimistic that corporate democracy155 would protect shareholder interests
new age of corporate political spending by publicly-traded companies.  Today, corporate managers need
not disclose to their investors—individuals, mutual funds, or institutional investors such as government
or union pension funds—how funds from the corporate treasury are being spent, either before or after
the fact.  And the law does not require corporate managers to seek shareholder authorization before
making political expenditures with corporate funds.”).
149. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 146 (2010)
(“[I]ncreasing disclosure and disclaimer requirements for corporations making expenditures in connec-
tion with political campaigns . . . seems initially attractive to both libertarians and egalitarians.”).
150. Bebchuk et al., Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending Petition for Rulemak-
ing at Securities and Exchange Commission, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-
637.pdf (Aug. 2, 2011) (“Because the Commission’s current rules do not require public companies to
give shareholders detailed information on corporate spending on politics, shareholders cannot play the
role the Court described.”); see also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1199–1207 (1999) (arguing in favor of
stronger mandatory SEC disclosure rules in order to increase corporate social transparency).
151. Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Petition to require
public companies to disclose to shareholders the use of corporate resources for political activities [File
No. 4-637], http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4-637.shtml (accessed on Feb. 24, 2013).
152. Matea Gold, Advocates Cheer SEC Consideration of Corporate Disclosure Rule, L.A. Times,
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-sec-campaign-spending-disclosure-20130108,0,55217.story
(Jan. 8, 2013).
153. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget Unified,
Regulatory Agenda and Regulatory Plan, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=
201210&RIN=3235-AL36 (accessed on Feb. 3, 2013).
154. Bebchuk &  Jackson, supra n. 30, at 89; see also John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its
Say.  Now Let Shareholders Decide, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/opinion/15bogle.
html (May 14, 2011) (arguing for a supermajority shareholder vote on corporate political spending).
155. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (“Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of
corporate democracy . . . can be more effective today because modern technology makes disclosure
25
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in preventing political spending that could offend investors.156  As the Citi-
zens United majority argued:
Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech ad-
vances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see
whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed interests.
The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citi-
zens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper
way.157
Justice Stevens writing for the dissent in Citizens United roundly rejected
this argument:
[B]y “corporate democracy,” presumably the Court means the rights of share-
holders to vote and to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty.  In
practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell you that “these rights are
so limited as to be almost nonexistent,” given the internal authority wielded
by boards and managers and the expansive protections afforded by the busi-
ness judgment rule.158
One reason for concern about the robustness of quotidian corporate
democracy comes from outside of the campaign finance context.  A year
after Citizens United, the SEC promulgated a rule pursuant to the Dodd-
Frank Act that would have given shareholders the ability to run their own
nominees for board elections.159  This proxy access rule was invalidated by
the D.C. Circuit Court.160  As a result of this ruling, the mechanisms of
corporate democracy are far from functional in the fundamental area of
board elections.161
rapid and informative.”); but see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93
Va. L. Rev. 675, 688–694 (2007) (discussing the various impediments that make it costly and difficult
for shareholders to replace incumbent directors).
156. See generally Julie N.W. Goodridge & Christine Jantz, Corporate Political Spending: Why
Shareholders Must Weigh In, The Journal of Values-Based Leadership, http://scholar.valpo.edu/jvbl/
vol5/iss2/3/ (2012).
157. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (internal quotations omitted).
158. Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668–56669 (2010) (codified at
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11) (“proxy access rule”).
160. The proxy access rule was vacated by Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Commn., 647 F.3d 1144
(D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder
Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?  Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge (working pa-
per), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-052.pdf (Jan. 19, 2012) (conclud-
ing “financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC’s 2010
Rule.”).
161. See e.g. Administrative Law—Corporate Governance Regulation—D.C. Circuit Finds SEC
Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis—Business Roundtable
v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 Harvard L. Rev. 1088, 1095 (2012) (“The effects of
[Business Roundtable v. SEC] are troubling.  The Business Roundtable ruling disrupts the SEC’s ability
to fulfill its statutory mandate to oversee the proxy process.”); Paul Hodgson, BRT and Chamber of
Commerce Prevail on Proxy Access, GMI Ratings, http://www3.gmiratings.com/home/2011/07/brt-and-
chamber-of-commerce-prevail-on-proxy-access/ (July 22, 2011) (“It is difficult to understand why any-
one who supports a successful capitalist economy, based on shareholders investing in good management
26
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IX. TREAT CORPORATIONS AND UNIONS ALIKE
Politically active corporations should be regulated in ways that mirror
union regulations so that shareholders receive a greater opportunity to con-
sent and increased transparency.  Clearly there are structural differences
among unions and corporations.162  Nonetheless, the principle ostensibly
animating the Court’s intervention in Knox is a desire to protect the individ-
ual’s ability to support only those political causes that coincide with the
individual’s belief system.  Consequently, if union nonmembers should not
be forced to subsidize speech with which they disagree, then shareholders
should likewise not have to subsidize speech with which they disagree.163
As Professor Victor Brudney noted, the fact that corporations can
spend in politics “leaves to be solved the crucial questions of the state’s
power to decide who, within the corporation, may authorize it to utter that
speech . . . .”164  Shareholders cannot prevent wasteful corporate political
spending under the current rules.165  As Professor John C. Coates IV con-
cluded, “Contrary to the Supreme Court’s stated assumption, shareholders
were not able to protect themselves from misuse of corporate funds for
political purposes prior to Citizens United, and the risk of such misuse has
increased as a result of the decision.”166  Yet the Court seemed willfully
blind to the problem of shareholders’ subsidizing objectionable corporate
and electing effective representatives to the board, should object to those shareholders occasionally
electing a representative directly, and getting rid of directors who clearly do not have their best interests
at heart.”).
162. One structural difference could be the lack of state action in the shareholder context.  However,
as noted above, state action does not appear to be a dispositive barrier to imposing consent mechanisms
in the private-sector union context.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra n. 30, at 114 (“[T]he union case and the
public company case [are] distinguishable because participation may be required by law in the former
but not the latter . . . [but] the volitional nature of being a shareholder . . . does not protect shareholders
from the consequences of political speech they disfavor.”); Sachs, supra n. 72, at 829 (“conditioning
economic opportunities on a political funding requirement is normatively problematic even in the ab-
sence of compulsion[—e]ven if employees are not ‘compelled’ to work for union employers or share-
holders are not ‘compelled’ to invest in the stock market . . . .”).
163. Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment,
91 Yale L.J. 235, 236–237 (1981) (“But the number of shareholders who are likely to disagree with
some of management’s political expenditures is not trivial . . . .”); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-
Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 646, 676 (1982) (“[D]emocratic theory still would not justify granting corporate executives discre-
tionary control over the massive corporate resources, which were gathered for commercial purposes, in
order to pursue their political objectives.”).
164. Brudney, supra n. 163, at 248.
165. Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Ins., and Govt. Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
Hearing on Corporate Governance After Citizens United, 111th Cong. 10–11 (Mar. 11, 2010) (State-
ment by Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Investors, “Left unchecked, management can
contribute to favored candidates, causes, or charities that have no value to the company or even advocate
positions contrary to shareowners’ best interests.”).
166. John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value before and after Citizens
United, 9 J. of Empirical Legal Studies 657–696 (Dec. 2012); see also Andy Kroll, Citizens United: The
27
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political speech at the same time they worked to protect union nonmembers
from even temporarily funding union political speech.
I am, of course, not the only one to suggest that there is a logical
chasm between how the Court treats corporations and unions that engage in
politics.  As Professor Reza Dibadj noted, “consider also that union mem-
bers have greater rights than shareholders vis-à-vis unwanted political
speech.”167  Indeed, Professors Charlotte Garden, Benjamin Sachs, Cathe-
rine L. Fisk, and Erwin Chemerinsky have all written compelling pieces on
this phenomenon of the Court’s treating corporations with deference while
micromanaging unions.  These professors have argued that the Court and
the legislatures they review should harmonize their approach to these two
politically active groups, either by relaxing the requirements for unions as
Professors Garden, Fisk, and Chemerinsky suggest or by requiring more of
corporations as Professor Sachs suggests.168
Professor Sachs notes the differential treatment of corporations’ and
unions’ political speech in the following manner: “By imposing such sub-
stantive and administrative burdens on unions but not corporations, the cur-
rent asymmetry treats political speakers differently. . . .  [T]here may be no
justification for this asymmetry.”169  Professor Sachs suggests that share-
holders should have a right to opt out of corporate political spending:
Congress [ ] and state lawmakers [have a] conceptually sound justification for
offering shareholders a right to opt out of financing corporate political activ-
ity. . . .  [S]uch a reform could . . . involve a requirement that corporations
offer shareholders the right to receive a dividend payment each year in an
amount equal to the shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporate budget that
was spent on politics.170
Professor Sachs is not alone in suggesting this opt-out prescription post-
Citizens United.  Attorney Jeremy Mallory articulated in a recent law re-
view article: “The most parsimonious solution would be to recognize that
the principles articulated in the union-dues and segregated-funds cases ap-
ply to the corporate context, warranting a remedy such as a pre-emptive
Shareholders Strike Back, Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/05/citizens-united-
home-depot-elections (June 1, 2011).
167. Dibadj, supra n. 126, at 467 (quoting Intl. Assn. of Machinists, 367 U.S. at 768–769 (“In Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. Street, the Supreme Court held that ‘§ 2, Eleventh [of the Railway
Labor Act] is to be construed to deny the unions, over an employee’s objection, the power to use his
exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes.’”)).
168. See Garden, supra n. 68, at 41–44; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 15; Sachs, supra n. 72, at
869.
169. Sachs, supra n. 72, at 808.
170. Id.
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 29  8-APR-13 12:52
2013 TAKING OPT-IN RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 129
opt-out by shareholders.”171  This solution has also been offered by Profes-
sor Jennifer S. Taub.172
While I agree with the basic premise of Professor Sachs’ analysis of
the problem, here I am suggesting a slightly different solution.  Professor
Sachs suggests that shareholders should be able to opt out of corporate po-
litical spending to earn an extra mini-dividend.173  I argue that, akin to the
right articulated for nonmembers of unions in Knox, shareholders should
have the right to opt in to corporate political spending through a shareholder
vote before a corporation spends in the political arena.174  And here I advo-
cate for a vote on the annual proxy as the means through which sharehold-
ers could manifest their objection or consent to corporate political spend-
ing.175
X. THE U.K. EXPERIENCE WITH “OPT-IN” FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES
Models of how to structure shareholder consent are rare, as many
countries simply ban corporate spending in elections.176  Yet the U.S. is not
171. Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People’s Money: Reconciling Citizens United with Abood and
Beck, 47 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1, 39 (2010).
172. Taub, supra n. 100, at 484 (“As an alternative, the statute might also permit investors across the
intermediation chain to, like union members, be given the right to opt out of political spending.”).
173. Benjamin Sachs, Corporate Shareholders Deserve Equal Rights on Campaign Finance, Atlan-
tic Wire, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/08/corporate-shareholders-deserve-equal-rights-
campaign-finance/55688/ (Aug. 13, 2012).
174. Here my proposal for shareholder consent that I have written about in more detail elsewhere is
most closely akin to that suggested by Professors Bebchuk and Jackson.  Others have also suggested this
reform as well. See e.g. Brian J. Robbins & Justin D. Rieger, Corporate Political Spending Post-Citi-
zens United, Law360 Expert Analysis, available at http://www.robbinsarroyo.com/shareholders-rights-
blog/robbins-umeda-attorneys-discuss-corporate-political-spending-in-law360/ (Sept. 28, 2011) (Argu-
ing, “Such reform could be accomplished by ensuring that: (1) corporations obtain shareholder approval
before making political expenditures; (2) shareholders define in advance how and when corporate funds
can be used in the political arena; and/or (3) corporations disclose material information concerning their
political spending decisions and the rationale behind those decisions to their stakeholders.”).
175. Annual shareholder proxy votes are a different mechanism than a Hudson notice followed by a
Knox “opt-in,” but they represent the closest workable analog in the corporate law context.  For a more
fulsome explanation, see Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why
the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach in Risk Management and Corporate Governance, supra n.
31, at 420 (“The reason I suggest the British model instead of a model where every individual expendi-
ture is subject to a separate shareholder vote is a deep concern about administrability and transaction
costs.  A system that puts every political action of a corporation to a vote would be costly and unwieldy
to administer.  By contrast, under this proposal, the corporation can simply add an additional question
(on the authorization of the political budget) to the list of items that are regularly subject to a shareholder
vote at the annual meeting, alongside traditional matters like reelecting the board of directors or ap-
pointing auditors.  This gives shareholders a say without making the whole process collapse under its
own weight.”).
176. Suzanne Mulcahy, Money, Politics, Power: Corruption Risks in Europe, Transparency Inter-
national, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/money_politics_and_power_corruption_risks_in_
europe (June 6, 2012) (“Some European countries have opted for a complete ban on corporate donations
([including] Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal) . . . .”).
29
Torres-Spelliscy: Taking Opt-In Rights Seriously: What Knox v. SEIU Could Mean for
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-APR-13 12:52
130 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 74
unique in allowing corporate political spending.  The U.K. has allowed cor-
porations to spend in Parliamentary elections, but the U.K. requires greater
regulation of corporations that politick than the U.S. does presently.  Share-
holder protections are needed here just as they are needed in the U.K.177
Thus, the U.K. provides a functioning model for U.S. regulators to emulate.
In 2000 and 2006, the U.K. amended its Companies Act to require
shareholder votes before public companies can spend in either U.K. or E.U.
elections.178  Before the 2000 amendments to the U.K. Companies Act, cor-
porate governance experts raised concerns about corporate managers in
public companies spending other people’s money in U.K. elections.  For
example, Anne Simpson from the Pensions and Investment Research Con-
sultants (“PIRC”) testified before a Parliamentary committee in 1998:
Our other main point is accountability. When the directors decide to make a
corporate donation, that is made from shareholder funds. . . .  In other words,
the majority of shareholders in British companies are institutions such as pen-
sion funds and insurance companies who are investing on behalf of others—
they are investing the public’s money by and large.  We therefore think it is
absolutely essential that the directors seek approval from shareholders for do-
nations that they wish to make from shareholders’ funds.179
A year later, Stephen Byers, the U.K. Secretary of State for Trade and In-
dustry, also showed concern about accountability when corporations spent
in elections, writing, “In recent years there has been growing concern about
directors’ accountability to shareholders in relation to political donations by
companies.  This concern is due in part to the scope for conflict between a
director’s personal wishes or interests and his duty to the company.”180
Consequently, the Parliamentary Committee studying the matter of corpo-
rate spending in the U.K. recommended greater transparency and share-
177. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812–813 (White, J., dissenting) (“There is an additional overriding interest
related to the prevention of corporate domination which is substantially advanced by Massachusetts’
restrictions upon corporate contributions: assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and
financially further beliefs with which they disagree where, as is the case here, the issue involved does
not materially affect the business property, or other affairs of the corporation. . . .  Massachusetts has
chosen to forbid corporate management from spending corporate funds in referenda elections absent
some demonstrable effect of the issue on the economic life of the company.  In short, corporate manage-
ment may not use corporate monies to promote what does not further corporate affairs but what in the
last analysis are the purely personal views of the management, individually or as a group.”).
178. See Companies Act 2006, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents;
Institute of Chartered Secretaries & Administrators, ICSA Guidance on Political Donations, https://
www.icsaglobal.com/assets/files/pdfs/081110%20-%20Political%20Donations.pdf (accessed Feb. 3,
2013) (providing an overview of how the Companies Act treats corporate political spending).
179. Committee on Standards in Public Life, Fifth Report, Standards in Public Life, The Funding of
Political Parties in the United Kingdom, 1998, Cmt. 4057–II, ¶ 3750, http://www.archive.official
documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4057/volume-2/volume-2.pdf (statement of Anne Simpson, Joint
Managing Dir., Pensions & Inv. Research Consultants Ltd.).
180. U.K. Dept. of Trade & Indus., URN 99/757, Political Donations by Companies ¶ 1.2, http://
web.archive.org/web/20000817034025/www.dti.gov.uk/cld/donation.pdf (1999).
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holder consent.181  Parliament adopted both recommendations in the Com-
panies Act’s 2000 Amendments, thereby increasing accountability by re-
quiring shareholder votes before the corporation can spend money from
general treasury funds for political purposes.182
A. How the U.K. Approach Might Translate in the American
Corporate Context
The International Corporate Governance Network considers the U.K.’s
approach to be a best practice.183  This group suggests: “Shareholders
should be able to vote on a company’s political donations policy, preferably
through a company-proposed resolution or, secondly, through a shareholder
resolution.  Shareholders should be able to vote on the maximum amount of
company donations for political purposes.  Shareholders also should be in a
position to vote on material changes to the company’s donations policy.”184
Of course there is a risk that what works abroad could get lost in translation
in the American context.  But there are enormous similarities between U.K.
and American corporate law, which make the importation of the U.K.’s
methods a reasonable approach.185
The Shareholder Protection Act, which has been introduced by both
houses of Congress, would import into the U.S. the U.K. approach of re-
181. Donations to Political Parties: The Neill Report’s Recommendations for Companies, PLC Mag-
azine, http://plc.practicallaw.com/8-100-8765# (Nov. 1, 1998) (“The report recommends that a company
intending to make a donation, whether in cash or in kind, and including any sponsorship, or loans or
transactions at a favourable rate to a political party should obtain the prior authority of its shareholders.
This authority could be in the form of a broad enabling power, valid for no longer than four years, and
could typically be conferred by a resolution passed at the company’s annual general meeting giving the
board of directors discretion about the making of such donations up to a prescribed limit.”).
182. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Shareholder Consent is Key in Political Spending, Brennan Center
for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/shareholder_consent_is_key_in_political_
spending/ (Mar. 16, 2010); Richard Williams, Regulating Political Donations by Companies: Chal-
lenges and Misconceptions, 75 The Modern Law Review 951, 960 (Nov. 2012) (“In practice, though,
the scope for self-interested conduct by directors will likely be much reduced by the [shareholder]
authorisation rule, not least because directors have clear incentives to disclose the intended direction or
purpose of donations, if not the intended recipients, at the time of authorisation.  Perceived abuse of an
authorisation resolution would reduce the chances of securing authorisation in the future and could even
put directors’ positions on the board in jeopardy.”).
183. International Corporate Governance Network, ICGN Statement and Guidance on Political Lob-
bying and Donations, http://www.responsible-investor.com/images/uploads/advertising/ICGN_PLD.pdf
(2012).
184. Id.
185. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. 59, 77–78 (2010) (“[T]he United States and the U.K.
share a common legal heritage and because their markets share important similarities—both have been
historically characterized by a base of dispersed investors.”); see generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999)
(explaining that the United States and the United Kingdom both demonstrate good shareholder protec-
tion and widely held medium-sized firms).
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quiring shareholder consent for corporate political spending.186  The Act
would change U.S. securities laws to require a shareholder vote to authorize
an annual budget for political expenditures before the money is spent.187
This bill would empower a majority of shareholders to act to approve cor-
porate political spending.188  In many ways this legislation is more modest
than the rights now available in the union context, where dissenting non-
members have been given primacy over the majority.
States have also explored the idea of adopting shareholder protection
laws through an admixture of state corporate laws and election laws.189
Some states have required boards of directors to approve future political
spending by corporate managers.  Board approval for corporate political ex-
penditures is required in three states: Missouri, Louisiana, and Iowa.190
Last year, Massachusetts introduced a bill that would require board ap-
proval before a company could engage in political expenditures.191  Con-
necticut’s legislature passed a similar bill, but it was vetoed by the gover-
nor.192  Board approval may offer a sensible middle ground between those
who want exclusive manager control and those who want significant share-
holder input.193
186. Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010); Shareholder Protection Act, H.R.
2517, 112th Cong. (2011); Shareholder Protection Act, S. 1360, 112th Cong. (2011).
187. Lisa Rosenberg, Bill Shines a Light on Corporate Political Spending, Sunlight Foundation
Blog, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/taxonomy/term/shareholder-protection-act/ (July 13, 2011)
(“In addition [to] making spending on our elections more transparent, the [Shareholder Protection Act]
bill will provide important protections to the millions of Americans who hold shares in publicly traded
companies.  Right now, if shareholders disagree with the political expenditures made by the companies
they own—if they even know about them—their only option to protest is to sell their stock.”); J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Shareholder Protection Act of 2011 – Preemption, Prevention and Protection (What Citi-
zens United May Have Wrought) – Part 1, CBA CLE Legal Connection, http://cbaclelegalconnection.
com/2011/07/j-robert-brown-jr-shareholder-protection-act-of-2011-preemption-prevention-and-protec-
tion-what-citizens-united-may-have-wrought/ (July 26, 2011).
188. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, 11 Reasons Why We Need the Shareholder Protection Act, Business
Ethics Magazine, http://business-ethics.com/2011/07/13/1225-opinion-11-reasons-why-we-need-the-
shareholder-protection-act/ (July 13, 2011).
189. For an overview of post-Citizens United state legislation January 2010–January 2011, see Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, Life After Citizens United, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-
elections/elections/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx (updated Jan. 4, 2011).
190. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Transparent Elections after Citizens United, Brennan Center, http://
www.brennancenter.org/publication/transparent-elections-after-citizens-united (Mar. 1, 2011); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 130.029; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:1505.2(F); Iowa Senate File 2354, signed by Governor Chester
Culver, April 8, 2010.
191. Mass. S.B. 305, http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/S00305 (2011).
192. Mark Pazniokas, Common Cause Slams Malloy Veto of Campaign Finance Bill, CT Mirror,
http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16655/malloy-vetoes-campaign-finance-bill (June 15, 2012) (discussing
the governor’s veto of H.B. 5556 in 2012).
193. Roger Coffin, A Responsibility to Speak: Citizens United, Corporate Governance and Manag-
ing Risks, 8 Hastings Bus. L.J. 103, 166 (Winter 2012) (“[P]olicy makers, including judges, state corpo-
rate law and model codes, should clarify that the independent members of a board of directors who are
subject to an open election process should have the responsibility to oversee corporate political speech
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A state could change its laws to give shareholders improved trans-
parency and consent regarding corporate political spending.194  In the past
two years, bills to this effect have been introduced in Maryland, New York,
California, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Maine.195  Maryland was the first
state to adopt a law requiring that disclosures of corporate political spend-
ing be made directly to shareholders.196
B. Constitutionality of the U.K. Approach
Since Congress and the states have yet to adopt requirements for share-
holder votes on corporate political spending, there has not yet been a case
or controversy for a court to adjudicate.  However, there is language in Citi-
zens United that gives the government the ability to protect shareholders.
As Justice Kennedy wrote for an eight-person majority:197
Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy
. . . can be more effective today because modern technology makes disclo-
sures rapid and informative. . . .  With the advent of the Internet, prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the in-
formation needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for
their positions and supporters.  Shareholders can determine whether their cor-
poration’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making prof-
its. . . .  [D]isclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech
of corporate entities in a proper way.198
in the same manner and with the fiduciary responsibilities with which boards oversee other variations of
corporate risk.”).
194. Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association, 85 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 3
(Fall 2012) (“Although the U.S. Constitution might preclude Congress from restricting corporate speech,
it does not necessarily preclude state governments from amending corporate law in a way that effec-
tively restricts the ability of entities incorporated within their jurisdiction from exercising this right.”
(internal citations omitted)).
195. See Md. S.B. 570, http://mlis.state.md.us/2010rs/bills/sb/sb0570f.pdf (2010); N.Y. S.B.
101–2011, http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S1012011 (2011); Cal. A.B. 919, http://corporate
reformcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/California-Shareholders_last-yearsbill.pdf  (2009); Pa.
H.B. 1002, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr
=2011&sessInd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr=1002&pn=1082 (2011); Maine H.P. 1120, http://
www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP1120&item=1&snum=125 (2011); Peter
Hardin, WI Senate OKs Shareholder Consent Bill, Gavel Grab, http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=9793 (Apr.
14, 2010).
196. MD Elec. Law §§ 13–306 and 307; Robert Stern, Sunlight State By State After Citizens United,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/sunlight-state-by-state-report.pdf (June 2012); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy,
Maryland Jumps to the Head of the Class, Brennan Center Blog, http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/
maryland-jumps-head-class (Apr. 12, 2011).
197. Eight Justices voted in favor of disclosure and disclaimers in both 2010’s Citizens United and
2003’s McConnell.
198. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
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The language of Citizens United is clear that shareholders have the right to
hold corporations accountable for their political spending.199  Accountabil-
ity may include a U.K.-style shareholder authorization through an annual
vote similar to the Knox requirement of an opt-in for unions.
Professors Bebchuk and Jackson intimate that legislation like the
Shareholder Protection Act is constitutional under the First Amendment.200
Indeed their own proposed solution would require a supermajority share-
holder vote before a company could spend in politics, which is an even
more stringent requirement than the majority vote contemplated in the
Shareholder Protection Act.201  Meanwhile Professors Robert Sprague and
Mary Ellen Wells have criticized the Shareholder Protection Act as not go-
ing far enough because dissenting shareholders who lost a vote would still
have to fund corporate political speech with which they disagreed.202  And
Professor Brudney once even suggested unanimous shareholder votes could
be required before a corporation could spend on politics.203
C. Popular Support for Shareholder Consent
As a democracy, American voters can choose to modify U.S. laws to
suit changed circumstances.  Polling since Citizens United indicates that
Americans would embrace requiring greater consent within corporations
concerning the issue of corporate political expenditures.204  Indeed, Ameri-
cans of all stripes have expressed their dismay with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United.  For example, a Washington Post-ABC News
poll conducted right after the decision found “[e]ight in 10 poll respondents
199. Even Professor Ribstein, who was actively hostile to shareholder protections after Citizens
United, acknowledged that Citizens United “upheld the disclosure and disclaimer provisions of the law
in question and suggested that regulation of corporate governance might pass constitutional muster.”
Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1019, 1021
(Summer 2011) (internal citations omitted).
200. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra n. 30, at 116.
201. Id. (suggesting that a requirement of up to four-fifths would probably pass constitutional mus-
ter).
202. Sprague & Wells, supra n. 16, at 554 (“[N]either bill addresses dissenting shareholders who,
like all shareholders under current law, may be forced into being associated with speech they may not
support.”).
203. Brudney, supra n. 163, at 241 (Writing in reaction to the Bellotti decision, Citizens United’s
precursor: “While other provisions of the Constitution may limit the government’s power to prescribe
the allocation of decision making authority, the restrictions on government power contained in the First
Amendment do not address, or without more inhibit, the government’s power to determine whether
corporate decisions should be made by officers or directors without even consulting stockholders, only
by stockholders, or only by supermajority or unanimous vote of stockholders.”).
204. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Knowledge Networks, Field Report: Constitu-
tional Attitudes Survey 101, Q515 (2010) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that in
response to the question, “Should corporations be required to get approval from their shareholders for
expenditures related to political campaigns?” 84.5% of those polled answered: “Yes”).
34
Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 35  8-APR-13 12:52
2013 TAKING OPT-IN RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135
say they oppose the high court’s Jan. 21 decision to allow unfettered corpo-
rate political spending, with 65 percent ‘strongly’ opposed.”205
The American public also wants better corporate controls in light of
Citizens United.  Another poll from February 2010 found a “majority of
voters strongly favor both requiring corporations to get shareholder ap-
proval for political spending (56 percent strongly favor, 80 percent total
favor) and a ban on political spending by foreign corporations (51 percent
strongly favor, 60 percent total favor).”206
Polling in 2012 shows little has changed in the intervening two years.
Democracy Corps found in November 2012:
Two thirds (64 percent) of 2012 voters said that democracy was undermined
in this election by big donors and secret money that control which candidates
we hear about. . . .  Voters give strong support across the board to a series of
reforms like closing the revolving door (81%), [and] increased disclosure of
outside money (85%).207
The 2012 polling has shown how frustrated American voters are with
corporate money in politics.208  Nearly nine in ten Americans agree that
there is too much corporate money in politics according to a poll released
by Bannon Communications on behalf of the Corporate Reform Coalition
in late October 2012.  This poll also found overwhelming support for corpo-
rate governance reforms in light of Citizens United.  According to the poll,
81 percent of Americans agree that companies should only spend money on
political campaigns if they disclose their spending immediately.209  This
poll also found that more than seven out of ten Americans (71%) favor a
requirement that a company’s shareholders approve all corporate political
spending before the money is spent.  These polls conclusively show that a
strong majority of the American public supports responding to Citizens
United by improving corporate governance to protect shareholders.
205. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing,
Wash. Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.
html (Feb. 17, 2010).
206. Stan Grenenberg et al., Strong Campaign Finance Reform: Good Policy, Good Politics, Green-
berg Quinlan Rosner Research, http://www.marylandpirg.org/sites/pirg/files/resources/Campaign-
Finance-Memo-Final.pdf (Feb. 8, 2010).
207. Stan Grenenberg et al., Voters Push Back Against Big Money Politics, Democracy Corps, http://
www.democracycorps.com/National-Surveys/voters-push-back-against-big-money-politics-full-report/
(Nov. 13, 2012).
208. Alex Seitz-Wald, Everyone Hates Citizens United, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2012/10/25/
people_really_hate_citizens_united/ (Oct. 25, 2012).
209. Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate Political
Spending and Support for Common Sense Reform, Demos, http://www.demos.org/publication/citizens-
actually-united-bi-partisan-opposition-corporate-political-spending-and-support (Oct. 25, 2012).
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XI. CONCLUSION
When a billionaire spends his own money in an expensive election like
the $7 billion federal election in 2012,210  such spending may be wasteful
vanity, but at least the money is his to squander.211  As this piece has ex-
plored, more difficult questions arise when the heads of organizations spend
money belonging to others for political purposes.  This phenomenon has
arisen in at least two contexts in American elections: in unions, where dues
are utilized, and in public corporations, where investor money is used for
electioneering.  The issue of prior consent for this type of political spending
has become pressing now that Citizens United has expanded the ability of
organizations like corporations and unions to electioneer.212
Our nation has struggled with regulating money in politics for centu-
ries.213  In the normal course of events, the political branches, the 50 states,
or voters choose the contours of such regulations.  Knox is remarkable be-
cause it makes the Supreme Court the source of a national paycheck protec-
tion rationale, at least in the case of special assessments for public-sector
unions.  But Knox raises the intriguing possibility that a future Supreme
Court (instead of a state legislature or Congress) could impose a share-
holder consent rule.  In the meantime, the onus is on state legislatures, Con-
gress, administrative agencies, and American voters to bring corporate po-
210. The amount of money spent in elections is of concern.  See Senator Tom Udall, Amend the
Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign
Finance Reform, 29 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 235, 235 (Fall 2010) (“This is the real danger of unrestricted
campaign expenditures—that elected officials legislate on behalf of corporations, unions, and other
powerful organizations instead of their constituents.”); see also Robert F. Bauer, Appraising Citizens
United, prepared for a conference at the Cato Institute, http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/
bauer-cato.pdf (Jan. 23, 2012) (“[I]n the time of billion dollar Presidential campaigns and multi-million
dollar Congressional campaigns, the question of campaign expense as a public policy concern might
have received more attention in the Court’s [Citizens United] analysis.  In the field of campaign finance,
cost is the ground from which spring all other issues of consequence.”).
211. Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Spend on the 2012 Election?, Salon, http://
www.salon.com/2012/12/23/how_much_did_sheldon_adelson_spend_on_the_2012_election (Dec. 23,
2012); Kevin Drum, Why Sheldon Adelson Spent $150 Million on the 2012 Election, Mother Jones,
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/12/why-sheldon-adelson-spend-150-million-2012-elec
tion (Dec. 3, 2012).
212. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra n. 30, at 84–85 (“[L]awmakers should develop special rules to
govern who may make political speech decisions on behalf of corporations” and “[t]he expansion of the
scope of constitutionally protected corporate political speech brought about by Citizens United, how-
ever, makes the need for such rules all the more pressing.”).
213. See e.g. Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill 27 (N.Y. Sup. 1843) (Supreme Court of New York discussing
an 1829 New York State law concluding, “The legislature evidently thought that the most effectual way
‘to preserve the purity of election,’ was to keep them free from the contaminating influence of
money. . . .  The legislature have [sic] said that the thing shall not be done, and that is enough.”);
Financing Presidential Campaigns: Report of the President’s Commission on Campaign Costs at 2
(President’s Commission 1962) (reporting to President Kennedy on the “rocketing costs of Presidential
campaigns, and the recurring difficulties parties encounter in meeting those costs”).
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litical spending rules in line with union political spending rules.  If unions
must jump through hoops to exercise their political rights, then corporations
should too.214
214. Ronald Gilson & Michael Klausner, Corporations Can Now Fund Politicians.  What Should
Investors Do?, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0329/opinions-citizens-united-corporate-
shareholders-on-my-mind.html (Mar. 29, 2010) (“The answer is to mandate that corporations let stock-
holders vote annually on whether they want the company to exercise the rights that Citizens United gave
them to get into political races.”).
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